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448 PEOPLE /'. MrCKELSON [59 C.2<1 
[Crim. No. 7295. In Bank. Apr. 18, 1963.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CURTIS RAY 
MICKELSON, Defpllclallt and Respondent. 
[lao 1 b] Searches and Seizures-Investigations Falling Short of 
Search.-The rule thnt circlllllstnnCE's short of probable causc 
to makE' an arrest Illay still justify an officpr's stopping pedes-
trians or motorists on the street for questioning does not con-
flict with U.S. Const., 4th Amend., forbidding unreasonable 
searches and seizures, but strikes a balance betwecn a per-
son's interest in illlmunity from police interference and the 
community's interest in law enforcement, and wards off pres-
sure to equate reasonable cause to investigate with reasonable 
cause to arrest, thus protecting the innocent from the risk of 
arrest when no more than rensonable investigation is justified. 
[2] Id.-Validity of Police Procedure.-A state ntle gO"erlliw~ 
police procedure with respect to searches nnd seizures is not 
unconstitutional merely because it permits conduct in which 11 
federal officer may not lawfully engage. 
(3] Id.-Validity of Police Procedure.-Before a state ntle gov-
erning police conduct with respect to searches and spizure;; 
may be struck down, it must appear that neither Congress 1W1" 
a state. legislature could authorize it; if a state adopts rulcs 
of police conduct consistent with the requirements of U.S. 
Const., 4th Amend., forbidtling unreasonable searches and 
seizures, and if its officers follow those rules, they do not act 
unreasonably within the. meaning of the amendment although 
different ntles may govern federal officers. 
[4] Id.-Search of Vehicles-Reasonable Cause.-Althongh it was 
not unreasonable for a police officer to stop an automobile 
for investigation and to take rea~onable precautions for his 
own safety in view of the fact that the driver's description 
was similar to the description, previously given to the. officer, 
of the robber of a market, a search of the automobile which 
turned up evidence conn('cting a passenge.r in the vehicle 
to burgll1ries of telephone booths exeeeded the bounds of 
reasonable investigation and was not justified by probable 
[1] See Ca1.Jur.2tl, Searches alltI Seizures, § 31. 
[4] Search of automobile without warrant by office.rs relying on 
description of persons suspected of a crime, note, 60 A.L.R. 299. 
See also Ca1.Jur.2d, Searches and Seizures, § 43; Am.Jar., Searches 
and Seizures (1st ed § 18). 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Searches and Seizures, § 6; [2, 3] 
Searches and Seizures, § 1; [4] Searches and Seizures, § 3L 
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cau~c to mnke un llrl'C,,;t where tlll'rc cuuhl hU\'e been more 
th:tn onc person abroad Ilt night who fitted till' al'scription of 
the market robber, where the drivcr, though ill the vicinity 
of the rohbery, was not obser\'ed until about 20 minutcs after 
it occurrl'd whl'n he WllS driving toward the scene of the crime, 
not tlWIlY from it, whl're the of ticer's in\'"estigation elicited 
idcntification on reque~t llm} a story t'ollsistl'nt with the auto-
mobile's movcments llud the oitiel'l"s own assessment of those 
movements, and whel'c the OCCUIJltllts of the Cllr were out of the 
cllr and UWlly from ully weapon,,; that might ha're been con-
cealcd thcrein. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County setting aside all information. Walter R. 
Evans, Judge.- Affirmed. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, William E. James, As-
sistant Attol'lll'y General, William B. 1\1cKessoll, District At-
torney, Harry 'Vood and Harry Sondheim, Deputy District 
Attorneys, for Plaintiff alld Appellant. 
Gladys Towles Root, Eugene V. McPherson and Philip C. 
Greenwald for Defendant and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defclldant was charged in two counts of 
an information with committing burglaries of telephone booths, 
in violation of Penul Code, section 459. His motion to set 
aside the information was granted (Pen. Code, § 995), and 
the People appeal. The Attorney General concedes that there 
was 110 evidence at the preliminary hearing to support count I 
ana seeks a reversal only as to count II. 
A Burbank police officer discovered the physical evidence 
supporting count II in the course of searching an overnight 
bag found under the front seat of an automobile in which 
defendant had bcen riding and which Don Zauzig had been 
driving. The bag contained $85.90 in nickels, dimes, and quar-
ters. At defen{iant's preliminary hearing, the bag and its 
contents were introduced ill evidence, and Zanzig testified 
to his and defel1dal1t'~ coml\lissi~n of the bnrglary. Zausig's 
arrest and his availability as a ""itness were direct results of 
the search that disclo:!cd the' physical evid('nce of the burglary. 
If that search was ill('gal,neither the physical evidence nor 
Zauzig's testimony is competent to support the information. 
-.Aasiped by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
• c.2d-IS 
) 
) 
450 PEOPLE t1. MICKELSON [590.2d 
(Sil'vCl'tlt07'lIe Lbr. Co. v. United Sta'('.~, :!ij! U.S. 385, 392 
[40 S.Ct. 182, G.\: L.Rd. 319, ;)21, 24 .A.I.J.R 1426, 1428]; 
Weiss v. linited Statts, 308 U.S. 321, 330-3:n [60 S.Ot. 269, 
84 L.I~u. 298, 303J ; Nardone Y. r:llitcd States, 308 U.S. 338, 
341 [60 S.Ot. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307, 311-312]; Wong Sl'" v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471 [83 S.Ot. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 
441] ; People v. Bagel', 4,1 Oa1.211 459, 462 [282 P.2d 509] ; 
People v. Dixon, 46 Ca1.2d 456, 458 [296 P.2d 557] ; People 
v. Schaumloffcl, 53 Ca1.2d 96, 101·102 [346 P.2d 393]; 
People v. Ditson, 57 Ca1.2d 415, 439 [20 Oal.Rptr. 165, 369 
P.2d 714].) 
The Attorney General contends, however, that the arresting 
officer had reasonable cause to arrest Zauzig for a rec~llt rob· 
bery in the neighborhood and that the search of the car was 
therefore justified as incidental to the arrest. Before the <1,.-
cision of the United States Supremc Court in Map}) v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 [81 S.Ot. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081], ,,',' 
,vere free to determine such an issue under the Cali l'ol'llia 
decisions setting forth the rules governing police inwstiga. 
tions and arrests. In view of the holding in that case that the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires state courts to exclude un-
constitutionally obtained evidence, we must determine at the 
outset whether the federal rules governing police invef'tiga. 
tions and arrests have superseded our own. TIH'n! are 
significant differences between the respective rules that are 
relevant to this case. 
In Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103 [80 S.Ot. 168, 
4 L.Ed.2d 134, 139], the United States Supreme Court held 
that an arrest occurs ''fhen an automobile is stopped during 
the course of a criminal investigation, and if the officer docs 
not have reasonable cause to arrest the occupant at that tim!', 
the arrest is unlawful. Anything the officer lcarns as a result 
of stopping the automobile is inadmissible in evidence and 
cannot justify a search. (See also Brinegar v. United States, 
338 U.S. 160, 166 [69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.E<1. 1879, 1885J; Rios 
v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261-262 [80 S.Ot. 1431, 4 
L.Ed.2d 1688, il693"1694].) [1a] In this state, however, 
we have consistently held that circumstances short of prob-
able cause to make an arrest ~ay still justify an officer's 
stopping pedestrians or motorists on the streets for question· 
ing. If the circumstances warrant it, he may in self.protection 
request a suspect to alight from an automobile or to submit 
to a superficial search for concealed weapons. Should the 
I investigation then reveal probable cause to make an arrest, the 
) 
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officer may UlTt'lSt the lSusp~ct and COIiUl!ct a reasonable inci-
uental search. (l'eople v. Simon, 4.:; Ca1.2d 645, 650 [290 
P.2d 531] ; People v. ilJa/'tin, 46 Cal.:!ll 106, 108 [29:3 P.2d 
52] ; People v. Blodgett, 46 Ca1.2d 114, 117 [293 P.2tl 57] ; 
PCO})[c v. Beverly, 200 Cal..App.~(l 119, 125 [19 Ca1.Rptr. 
67]; ['cople v. King, 17i'i C31.AI'P.2d 386, 390 [346 P.2d 
235] ; People \' . .:1llllshct'itz, lS3 Cal.App.2d 75~, 755 [6 Cal. 
Rptr.78':;].) 
The Mapp case did not determine whether or not the states 
must follow all the federal rules. ~either did Elkins v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 206 [80 S.Ct. 1437, 145:3, 4 L.Ed.2d 
1669], which Oil this matter held only that the condud of 
state offieers would be measured against the federal rules 
when state-secured evidl'l1ce was offered in federal prose-
cutions. 
[2] A state rule gov('1'ning police procedure is not uncon· 
stitutional merely because it permits conduct in which a fed-
eral officer may not lawfully engage. The Fourth Amend. 
ment! itself sets forth 110 more than the basic outlines of 
lawful law enforcement. It becomes meaningful in specific 
situations only by reference to the common law and statutory 
law governing the issuance of warrants, the authority of 
officers, and the power to arrest. Illcgally obtained evidence 
may be excluded by the federal courts for various reasons. 
It may be excluded because it was obtained in a way that 
could not constitutionally be authorizcd. It may be excluded 
because it was obtained in violation of a federal statute or 
a common-law rule or a state rale applicable to federal 
officers. It may be exelnded by virtue of the Supreme Court's 
monitorship of the federal administration of criminal justice. 
(Fed. R. Crim. Proc., 3, 4, 26, 41; 18 U.S.C. App., pp. 3407-
3452 (1958).) 
The United States Supreme Court has not interpreted the 
Fourth Amendment as requiring that court to day do\vn as a 
matter of constitutional law pre('isc rules of police conduct. 
Indeed, its rule allowing a srarch by a fcderal officer without 
a warrant as incident to a lawful arrest pcrmits reference to 
state law to determine the validity or the arrest. (Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U.S. 19, 15 [68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436, 
'" The right of tl,e people to be sI'eure ill their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against ulIl'L'a~onn]'Je sean'hc~ and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, Lut upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly d(>seribing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 
) 
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441] ; United Statcs v. Di Rc, 332 U.S. 581, 589 [68 S.C't. 222, 
92 L.Ed. 210, 2171.) [3] Accordingly, berol'e a state rule 
governing police conduct may be struck down, it must aplwar 
that neither Congress nor a state legislature could authori:~l' 
it. If a state adopts rules of police couduct cOllsistent with 
the requirement>; of the Fourth Amendment amI if its officers 
follow those rules, they do not act unreasonably within the 
lIleaning of the amendment although differellt rules Illay 
govern federal officers. 
[lb] We do not believe that our rule permitting temporary 
detention for questioning conflicts with the Fourth Amend-
ment. It strikes a balance between a persoll's intercst ill im-
muuity from police illterference and the commuuity's interest 
in law enforcemeut. It wards off pressure to equate rea!;on-
able cause to investigate with reasonable cause to arrest, tIm!; 
protecting the i11110ccnt from the risk of arrest wh(>n no mort' 
than reasonable investigation is justified. (See Darrett, Pr/,-
sonal Rights, P/,0PC1·ty Rights, a-lid The Fourth A.mcndlllrnt, 
1960 Sup.Ct. Rev. 46,65-66,69-70.) 
The United States Supreme Court apparently concluded tl1at 
the situations presented in the Henry, Rios, and Brinegar 
cases allowed 110 middle ground (sec dissenting opinion of 
Jackson, J. in Brinegar v. UnUccl States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 
[69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879, 1894]), and hence that the 
officers were uot justified in stopping the defendants' auto-
mobiles unless they had probable cause to make arrests. It 
does not follow that its conclusion was constitutionally com-
pelled. Given the absence of legislation, the court had to 
articulate the governing rule and enforce compliance with it. 
It did not thereby foreclose Congress or the states from artic-
ulating other reasonable rules consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment. 
[ 4] It remains to determine whether the sC'arch in this case 
complied with the rules of this state. The arresting officer 
testified that he arrested defendant aud Zauzig shortly before 
2 a.m. about 20 minutes after he had gone to a market on 
San Fernando Road where a robbery had just been reported. 
He was told by other officers at the market that the robber 
was a fairly tall white man of large build with dark hair 
who was wearing.a rcd sweater and armed with a .45 auto-
matic. The officer searched the area on foot for about 10 
minutes and then rl'turned to his car to !;carch a wider area. 
While driving west on Providenci~ about !;ix hlocks from the 
market he saw a station wagon coming toward him with two 
.\pr.l%ilj 453 
1I('1':;oIlS ill it. 'J'llt' dri\'l'L' aPI"'al'l'rl to L~ a hug'·.' white man 
wHit dal'l, hail' w,'arillg' a ."',1 S\\'l'atel' or jaekL't, The officer 
saw thc ::;tatio11 wagon turll l:iouth on San Fernando toward 
the lllal'ket, alltI hc tlll'lled south illto an alley and then west 
at thc next Sh'l'd, He then saw the station wagon turn west 
f.'olll Sun l'\~L'lIalldo Oil the sallie str'eet and followed it, The 
station wagoll WClit to the cud of the street wh('re it came 
to Il l!t'adl'IHI, made a U-t urll, aud proceeded back toward 
San Fernando, 'fhe officer cil'ckd a block to his right aud 
1u1'llt',1 sonth on San PCL'wu\(lo, lIe was then a block or two 
hehind the :station wagon, wIdth was traveling' south on San 
1·'cril:mJo at about 25 or 30 lUiles per hour, The officer over-
took the station ',ragon alld obsl'l'Yed the paSSl'nger "bend 
i"JL'ward ill the st'at, fOi'\\'i\l'd and down and rais~ back up." 
He tUl'JlCU on his red light, the :,:tl1tio11 wagon pulled over 
nllll stopped, and tllC ofill'er parked behind it, III" radioed 
his location to hl':lll'1uaL'tl'I's and l'e1luestell a backup car for 
assistmlCc, Meanwhile Zan7ig got out of the dl'ivt:'1"s seat of 
thc station m:g'oll and walkl'd to the officer's car, The officer 
asl,ed Zauzig wlll'l'e ile was gOillg', alHl Z;{l1zig' told him he 
was gOillg hOlllc to UI('lJ(lale, that he was more or less lost, 
and had heen driying up aull downsidestrt'ets looking for the 
fL'eeway. He :;howed the officer his driyt·1"s license. The 
a:,;sisting offic('I'S al'l'ivC'u, IlIllI the offic('l's Hnd Zauzig walked 
to the station wagon. Defendant was sittillg in the right front 
seat and got out on request. The arresting officer looked 
under the right fl'~lIlt seat and on the floorboards and saw an 
overnight bag stuffed ulltlt>r the right front seat. He pulled 
it out, unzipped it, amI saw four sCi'cwdri"ers, a flashlight, a 
pair of canvas glovl'3 alld two socks. One sock was knotted 
at the top and was filled with something that jingled, \Vhen 
he took the hag out of the car, the officer asked Zauzig w11at 
it was, aud Znnzig told him that it was his basketball equip-
ment. The offlccr u"kcd what was in the sock, and Zauzig 
told him that he had some dimes. The officer opened the 
sock and founu nick('18, dimes, and quarters, He arrested 
Zauzig amI (It·fl'IHlant 011 suspicion of burglary. The officer 
also testified that tht'l'e was lIothing in his conversation with 
Zauzig that ~\'ould it~(lieate that he had perpctrated a robbery 
other than that he adcd a hit fl'it'mlly, The Il1nvements of 
the car were suelL that. it was 01)vious that the occupants were 
either tryillg to ('vade tlw offil'cl' or were confused and did 
1I0t know the art'a vcry wrIt. IIis purpose in examining the 
bag was the "possibility of a gun being there." After he 
) 
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had talked [0 Zau .. i6 :.tau (ld'lHtlant he was satisfi.l'll that they 
had not bel'll involved iu tile rohbery. 
It WliS not ullreasonable fot' til(' ofi1cl'l' to stop Zau7Jg's car 
for investigation audto take reasonable preeantiolls for his 
own ~afety. He did not have prohahleeause, however, to 
arrest Zauzig for l'obbery. 'l'hcre could have been more than 
one tall white lUan with dark hait· wparing a red sweater 
abroad at night in such a ml'tl'opolitan m·ea. Although Zall-
zig was in the viciuity of the robhery, he was 110t observed 
until about 20 minute'S aftcr :t ot'clll'l"nl wl1I'lI II(' was driving 
toward the ::celle of the crime, not away from it. The officer 
had no information that the robber hail ail automobile or a 
coufederate. 'rhc erratic route of the car and defendant's 
lllowmellt in the scat werc. at lUOst suspicious circumstances. 
Theoffieer's inve;,tigation clicited id('lltification upon reqnest 
and a story consistent with the movements of the car and 
the officer's own assessment of those movements. Both oceu-
pallt;; were out of the car away from any weapous that might 
have heen concealed therein. Illsteail of interrogating Zau-
zig and defendant with respect to the robbery or rcquestil\~ 
them to aecompany the officers the few blocks to the market 
for possible identification, the officer elected to rummage 
through closed baggage found in the car in the hope of turn-
ing up evidence that might eOlmect Zauzig with the robbery. 
'£hat search exceeded the bounds of reasonable investigation. 
It was not justified by probable cause to make an arrest, and 
it cannot be justified by what it turned up. (People v. Brow?1,. 
45 Ca1.2d 640, 643·644 [290 P.2d 528) ,) 
The order is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer,J., Tobriner, J., and Peek, J., con-
curred. 
PETERS, J.-I concur. 
I agree tlmt the search hl'1"e involved was illegal, both under 
state and federal law. Therefore, I agree that the order 
appealed from must be affirmed. But, in my opinioll, smeh 
holding makes it unncccssary to discuss the scope and impact 
on state law of the decision of lrlapp v. Ohio, 367 F.S. 643 
[81 S.Ct. 1684,~6 L.Ed.2d 1081]. In myopinioll the deter-
mination of that important eOll-;titutional qUe'stion should be 
left to a case where it is directly involved. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would reVl'rse the order of the 
trial court as to count II amI afI1rlll the order as to count I, 
) 
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[59 C.2<1 455: 30 Cal.Hptr. 1~9. ~.;O !·.~1 817] 
for the rcasons expressed by Mr. Presiding Justice Fox in the 
opinion prepared by him '::01' the District Court of Appeal 
in PCOlllo v. Mickelson (Ca1.App.) 26 Cal.Rptr. 152. 
App('llant's petition for a rl'hcarillg' was ueni,.'u l\Iay 14, 
1963. McComb, J., was of the opinion that the petition shouhl 
be granted. 
